Friday, May 24, 2013

Inauthentic Authenticity: The Problem of Inheriting the Concept


We stumble upon a situation of remarkable irony when we realize that there is perhaps no concept in the Heideggerian corpus more improperly inherited than that of eigentlichkeit, or, as it has been most commonly inherited in English thought, authenticity. Ironic --and, when understood as an indication of an historical condition unique to the present age, ominous. This irony is prima facie not entirely lost on Stuart Shneiderman, who remarks on its historical significance, observing: 
In the age of authenticity more people aspire to authenticity than know what it is. But, we have it on the authority of no less a philosopher than Martin Heidegger, the godfather of authenticity, that small talk or idle chatter (gerede) is bad.
Heidegger extended the category of idle chatter to any use of language that is formulaic, that repeats commonly accepted wisdom and that expresses what everyone thinks, rather than what I think. Authentic speech, in Heidegger’s philosophy, wells up from the depths of your soul. It is original and personal and unique to you. It might involve your latest research into Western metaphysics; it might express your sentiments about the state of German politics in 1933.
There may be good reasons for calling ours "the age of authenticity," or, better, the age where an historical decision gets forced upon human beings regarding whether and how they can any longer be authentic, but as Shneiderman goes on, it becomes increasingly clear that his own rough account of the question of authenticity is itself an instance of a rather common, public acceptance of the term --an instance, that is, which is at variance with Heidegger's own nuanced use of it. Shneiderman has merely taken over this common notion of authenticity without first putting the very term itself up for question. His use of "authenticity" is as unexamined as it is inauthentic. To see why one need merely to return to Heidegger's own use of the term, since, by Shneiderman's own admission, Heidegger is none other than the "godfather of authenticity" (a rather hilarious title). And what is it that marks Heidegger's understanding of "authenticity" as a unique understanding? What is it that makes the meaning  Heidegger imparts to the words so distinctively...Heideggerian? Is it so obviously true that, for Martin Heidegger, "small talk or idle chatter (gerede) is bad." Not at all. Though this misunderstanding is persistent and widespread, the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit is emphatically clear on this, in a move that makes his understanding of authenticity uniquely his own: authenticity is a mere "existentiell modfication" of inauthenticity; the latter is presupposed by the former. That is to say, not only does "gerede" as a devolution or falling away from the more original "rede," but also "eigentlich rede," such as the eventual discourses of philosophy, poetry, the State, etc. has its origins in "Alltäglichkeit" ---and that means in a domain where the everyday "connection-making small talk" called gerede has its home. Thus when you write that Heidegger claims authentic speech "wells up from the depths of your soul" you misconstrue his unique insight. In fact, Heidegger goes so far as to say that there is no "your" in "your soul" unless it is first wrested from "Their" or "One's" soul or understanding (Das Man). To miss this is to miss the entire raison d'etre for the second division of SZ's prospectus, namely, the "Destruktion" of the history of ontology, in which the so-called "primordial understanding of Being" is to be retrieved precisely from those now formulaic traditional ontological assertions. The inauthentic harbors the authentic and is its condition of possibility. Recognizing the necessity and even worth of inauthenticity is not as un-philosophic a gesture as Shneiderman's amusing piece would have its readers believe, Indeed, it is, for Heidegger, the only way something that was once called philosophy can be done in the present age; the thought of Being is essentially historical, if by historical we mean inherited and not, therefore, initially owned up to. It presupposes a condition of historical irresponsibility. Shneiderman ends his piece offering the following advice:"The next time a Pied Piper comes along to suggest that you give up schmoozing in the name of authenticity, think twice before going along." But "thinking twice" is precisely what distinguishes the authentic from the inauthentic. By the same token, one wouldn't have the opportunity to "think twice" without encountering the received (inauthentic) wisdom (e.g. "inauthenticity is bad") of some pied piper. The matter is thus a complicated one and it indicates a unique historical danger in the present age. And it was Heidegger who first of all, in a dangerous move which threatened to eclipse itself simply by being communicated, so powerfully drew attention to this.
     

16 comments:

  1. I think I am in agreement with the main point of your post. I have myself encountered a few who have essentially misconstrued Eigen- und Uneigentlichkeit. Usually I find them to be mouthpieces for a cloaked, sometimes distinctly kantisch, subject. Sometimes, for example, like what we find in the Staumbaugh's late 70's essay on Authenticity/Inauthenticity in SZ, this becomes more apparent because of the author's approach to a specific textual problem. Staumbaugh (and this is the ex-pupil of Heidegger, most recent translator of SZ Staumbaugh) is actually a particularly relevant example to use here, because her whole essay operates around a dilemma provoked by that claim of Heidegger's which you made central to your post. You write:

    "the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit is emphatically clear on this, in a move that makes his understanding of authenticity uniquely his own: authenticity is a mere "existentiell modfication" of inauthenticity; the latter is presupposed by the former."

    Staumbaugh points out that Heidegger actually makes the opposite claim later in the text. She doesn't actually cite the page numbers from SZ in her essay, but after some digging I located the ones she used. I'll give two pairs of examples from her essay.

    First, from the end of that familiar and famous section on alltägliches Selbstsein, which I think you probably had in mind in your post, Heidegger says: Ex. 1) Das eigentliche Selbstsein beruht nicht auf einem vom Man abgelösten Ausnahmezustand des Subjekts, sondern ist eine existentielle Modifikation des Man als eines wesenhaften Existenzials. (The authentic Self rests not on an exceptional state of the Subject, but rather it is an existentiell modification of the "they" as of an essential existential.) (SZ, 130)

    Second, from a much later section (64), but referring back to his earlier analyses of Das Man, Heidegger writes: Ex. 2) Es zeigte sich, zunächst und zumeist ist das Dasein nicht es selbst, sondern im Man-selbst *verloren*. Dieses ist eine existentielle Modifikation des eigentlichen Selbst. (It became evident [in that earlier analysis of das Man--U.D.], that first of all and for the most part Dasein is not itself, but has been lost in the "They-Self." This (Self) is an existentiell modification of the authentic Self. (SZ, 318.)

    Staumbaugh's second example pair runs as follows (I'm not sure where the second example is in the text. The first is at the end of the section on Verfallenheit, i.e., SZ 179): Ex. 1) ist die eigentliche Existenz nichts, was über der verfallenden Alltäglichkeit schwebt, sondern existenzial nur ein modifizertes Ergreifen dieser. [Authentic existence is nothing that floats over falling everydayness, but existentially it is only a modified apprehension of it.] Ex. 2) “Inauthenticity has possible authenticity as its ground,”

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  2. Now, clearly neither of the first two passages literally state one existential mode serves as the condition for the possibility of the other. (What it "actually" says, of course, depends upon seizing on the proper point of departure for its interpretation--Staumbaugh as contrasting example, expressly understands SZ as basically a Kantian essay, and (mis)construes the whole dilemma accordingly. She also completely neglects considering what Heidegger means by an existentiell modification of an existential, which seems crucial for correctly relating those possibilities to each other.) Of the second set, the last example points to possible authenticity as the ground of inauthenticity, which would seem to run counter to that part of your post. Staumbaugh takes it that authenticity is "more primordial" than inauthenticity.

    For my part, I'm not convinced Staumbaugh's interpretation accurate, but not because I think that when properly interpreted, inauthenticity ultimately manifests itself as the "condition for the possibility" of authenticity, as you put it in your post. Rather, as I understand it, both Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit are seized upon in SZ in terms of temporality (SZ 328),or a.k.a. what Heidegger means by Alltäglichkeit: mit dem Titel Alltäglichkeit im Grunde nichts anderes gemeint ist als die Zeitlichkeit. (SZ, 372) [At bottom nothing other is meant by the term everydayness than temporality.] You suggest this in your post: not only does "gerede" as a devolution or falling away from the more original "rede," but also "eigentlich rede," such as the eventual discourses of philosophy, poetry, the State, etc. has its origins in "Alltäglichkeit." However, given the context of the remark, I interpret you to be identifying everydayness as the realm of inauthenticity.

    But I would say this identification is ruled out automatically by the fact that Alltäglichkeit is the origin of the differentiation between the authentic and inauthentic modes of existence--everdayness is the realm of existential Indifferenz. Dasein's Indifferenz is how it is zunächst und zumeist. Here, I am just repeating what I find Heidegger himself to be saying: Das Dasein soll…in seinem indifferent Zunächst und Zumeist aufgedeckt werden. Diese Indifferenz der Alltäglichkeit des Dasein is nicht nichts, sondern ein positiver phenomenaler Charakteristik dieses Seienden. Aus dieser Existieren heraus und in sie zurück, ist alles Existieren, wie es ist. Wir nennen diese alltägliche Indifferenz des Daseins: Durchschnittlichkeit. [Dasein ought to be uncovered in its indifferent "first of all and for the most part." This indifference of everydayness of Dasein is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this being. Out of this mode of existing and back into it again is all existence, in the way that it is. We designate this everyday indifference: Averageness. (SZ, 44)]

    As you can probably tell, this line of thought runs somewhat counter to the usual interpretation, according to which everydayness more or less designates the realm of inauthentic existence. Modal Indifferenz proximally and for the most part goes unnoticed, also in secondary literature and commentary on SZ, in its identity with everydayness, and also in its relationship to authenticity and inauthenticity. In any case, I would say that Heidegger's unique voice in SZ, his peculiar Weg des Denkens in that work, comes down to the existentiell manner in which alltägliche Indifferenz--not yet Uneigentlich existence--is inherited and preserved, namely, as the condition for the possibility of its proper ontological consideration. Ultimately, that Bedingung der Möglichkeit is temporality. I say this, granted of course, that Heidegger opened up a way in SZ to a more proper and original thinking of Eigentlichkeit on its own terms, which, nevertheless, he could only eventually think about.

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  3. Thanks for the carefully written comments, Jeremiah. You make some good points and those are nice chestnuts from SZ ---thanks for providing the German for clarity's sake. I also don't agree with much of Stambaugh (and even though its great to have her translation I prefer McQuarrie for a slew of reasons) --especially with the very much obsolete stuff (as in Stambaugh from the late 70's).
    To be honest, the interpretation you're outlining is not foreign to me --you may have forgotten, but I myself placed great weight on Modal Indifferenz in the proposed reading I made when going through SZ together with you four years ago in Boston. For your own research purposes now, you should be aware if you are not already that John Caputo, among a few others, also understands the functional importance of this concept in SZ. Obviously, having initially realized this importance myself four or five years ago (I think I was going through SZ for my fourth time when it jumped out), I have had time time to turn it over in my mind. My understanding has developed in a certain direction regarding the whole network of concepts in SZ to which the concept of Modal Indifferenz belongs. We are in complete agreement regarding the fact that Modal Indifferenz precedes both authenticity and/or inauthenticity (nothing in the above post stands in contradiction to this), and I think you are right when you identify the place where we disagree in the proper meaning and character of Alltaeglichkeit. The problem I have with your interpretation is that it doesn't seem able to account properly for the as an existential, which it manifestly is. My interpretation is at variance with your own not because I don't recognize the structure of modal indiffernz but because I do not think that authenticity is achievable in the present age without being preceded by inauthenticity. It is in this that my thesis regarding these relations lies latently expressed. The question regarding these is clarified entirely by the later Being-historical reclamation of the essence at the heart of technology and the tensions present in SZ regarding this family of concepts can be successfully navigated using that compass ---without any need for overt reference to the later work.

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    1. Clarification: "The problem I have with your interpretation is that it doesn't seem able to account properly for DAS MAN as an existential." The importance pf this cannot be overstated as a critique of your account. Heidegger states clearly that this inauthentic self is an existential. But where does he state that the authentic self is? Never. And this problematizes your desire to make "Alltäglichkeit "the origin of the differentiation between the authentic and inauthentic modes of existence" without acknowledging the primacy of Inauthenticity, and acknowledgment that would also require that you give up "ruling out automatically" the identification of alltaeglichkeit. My postion is that this identification is an historical possibility.

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  4. So, most succinctly, in defense of my own position, I would argue against or further qualify the following of your claims:
    1. First, that "both Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit are seized upon in SZ in terms of temporality" - this is undoubtedly correct in some manner correct ("in terms of temporality" is admittedly a vague phrase), but temporality does not provide the fundamental "terms" that govern this distinction. This is, I would claim (and claim that this is already textually supported in SZ) because the degree and nature of the possibility of authenticity is historical precisly *in a manner that supercedes zeitlichkeit* and requires that Temporalitaet be redefined altogether. I claim Heidegger has already projected this redefinition from out of the tensions he intentionally builds into the concepts of SZ.

    2.Secondly and linked to this is the real heart of our disagreement. Inauthenticity, I would claim MUST be the condition for the possibility of authenticity in the present age, i.e. the age which Sein und Zeit identifies as "Heute" in its first sentence. The thinking of SZ is not possible without the oblivion of Being, and Heidegger repeats this constantly in his own self-interpretations of that text from the 1930's on. In authenticity, heute, must precede authenticity. I already mentioned this qualification in my post above when I stated: "the "Destruktion" of the history of ontology, in which the so-called "primordial understanding of Being" is to be retrieved precisely from those **NOW** formulaic traditional ontological assertions." Actual authenticity so much presupposes in authenticity that it itself is nothing but a seizing upon that inauthenticity. For the second part of the first division this of course understood as schuldigkeit --we are guilty because we have *always* already inauthentically disposed our selves to the understanding of our own Being(-toward-Death). One has always already flown in the face of death, and this is factical existential circumstance is the very "content" of the existentiell modification which Heidegger calls authenticity. This is in no wise contradicted by the second example pair passages you cite from Stambaugh's reference, which in my opinion do not put Heidegger in conflict with himself:“Inauthenticity has possible authenticity as its ground,”The key word is "possible" and it refers to the state of Modal Indifferenz. But authenticity is precisely to distinguished from this state: Possible authenticity is not yet authenticity. But actual authenticity in the hermeneutic situatiion of SZ's heute, presupposes inauthenticity as the condition of its possibility, i.e. of its ability to become actual, or if you prefer, its realizability.
    3.) Thirdly I would dispute the assertion that Alltaeglichkeit is simply Indifference; Averageness is, in the present age, also fallen and thrown, fleeing from death and inauthentic. The phenomenological evidence bears this out; the comportment toward the zuhanden cannot be divorced from absorption (aufgehen), which a mode of having lost oneself (Selbstverlorenheit). The very structure of the world in which we uncover the ready to hand predestines us to first undergo actual inauthenticity while holding out the possibility that precisely this experience be reclaim in and as authenticity. That destination of inauthenticity is reached consummately in the current age.

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  5. Jerry, sorry for the typos by the way (my android is hard to type on with my grossly oversized thumbs). I hope it is intelligible enough (despite the many times that "In authenticity" = inauthentcity). I wanted to draw attention to one final thing regarding what I finished with in the last comment. It will be observed that when I said the "destination of inauthenticity is reached consummately in the current age", then according to the logic of my interpretation, this consummation is precisely the condition for the possibility of the emergence Heidegger's thought (externally marked by the 1927 publication of SZ). This would mark Heidegger's OWN effort in "thinking" as a pursuit of authenticity par excellence. And this is true...provided we hear the ambiguity and therefore tenuousness of the phrace "pursuit of authenticity." Thinking may be understood as a task of life that is indeed the most authentic --but it is a task that cannot accomplish itself. In this sense it is a possible task...but this possibility differs from that of Modal Indifferenz. And it presupposes the experience of inauthenticy... or as Heidegger would later modify it: the experience of the oblivion of Being, out of which he claim SZ was written.

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  6. Sorry about the delayed response, I wanted some time to mull over your remarks. Thank you for their thoroughness by the way, and also for the added clarifications--the only thing I was somewhat perplexed over was the omission of "das Man" in the first of your post. I had not forgotten your North End 'flections on modal Indifferenz. Sans those reflections, I probably would not have had much to say with regard to the possible function of Indifferenz within your post. In any case, I would be interested in hearing where those reflections in particular have led since then. I have to confess that I know only little about Caputo or his thoughts on Indifferenz, so thanks for pointing me his way. Now to business.

    Let me begin my reply by addressing your objection by way of its first-mentioned component: how my interpretation can account for das Man as an existential. You offer support for your objection by claiming Heidegger never says the Authentic Self is this, i.e., an existential. But I don't see how your assertion accounts for that statement of Heidegger's from earlier:

    Ex. 2) Es zeigte sich, zunächst und zumeist ist das Dasein nicht es selbst, sondern im Man-selbst *verloren*. Dieses ist eine existentielle Modifikation des eigentlichen Selbst. (It became evident [in that earlier analysis of das Man--U.D.], that first of all and for the most part Dasein is not itself, but has been lost in the "They-Self." This (Self) is an existentiell modification of the authentic Self. (SZ, 318.)

    So I ask you: How can the inauthentic Self be an existentiell modification of the authentic Self, if the authentic Self just is not an existential, that is, not essentially constitutive for existence? In connection with this, I also want to point out again that Heidegger nowhere in those excerpts claims that the inauthentic Self serves as the condition for the possibility of the authentic Self, or that inauthenticity as such does so (i.e., serves as the condition for the possibility of authenticity.) Even if it is true that none of those excerpts expressly undermine the former claim (the one you maintain in your post), neither do they expressly support it. In my opinion, this still is unaccounted for in your post. Finally, how should both authenticity and inauthenticity be regarded equally as modalities of existence [Modi der Existenz]--as Heidegger expressly says--if authenticity were not an existential, but only originated via an existentiell modification of one?

    On the other hand, my interpretation, which is that the authentic and inauthentic Self are constituted equiprimordially through Zeitlichkeit, or more precisely, that the latter makes possible both authenticity and inauthenticity, accounts for both possibilities considered as existential modalities, and the Selfhood of Dasein. Selfhood-- which is the condition for the possibility of both self-constancy of authentic existence and the self-inconstancy of inauthentic existence--itself is made possible by temporality and is essentially grounded in temporality--Dasein's ownmost Seinskönnen. Speaking of which, Heidegger is very clear that Verfallenheit, and likewise Dasein's Faktizität, spring from out of [entspringen] Dasein's ownmost authentic and original temporality, bzw. its Existenz, and are therefore grounded essentially in it. One only needs to see that in "making present" [Gegenwärtigen] which is the mode in which Dasein lets itself approach its ownmost Seinskönnen inauthentically, is contrasted with that authentic "making present" which expressly grounds the former and frees it up for its distinct ontological possibility: das Augenblick. The latter is that "having-been" [Gewesenheit] which comes to itself as such, as futural [zukünftig.] This is also the reason why das Augenblick as a "making present" cannot be construed in terms of the time determination "now."

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  7. It should be clear from this that temporality cannot itself be reduced to those fundamental existential modes it makes possible. Authentic temporality exceeds the limits of authenticity--but also does it exceed the bounds of inauthenticity--at the same time without satisfying the requirements for answering the Seinsfrage, or even standing as a sufficient answer to the specific formulation the Being-question received in SZ. So I might be in agreement with you on some level when I suggest here that temporality already in SZ points to possible, if still unarticulated, ontological horizon more original than temporality itself. This situation can be rephrased roughly as follows: temporality, and I speak of Zeitlichkeit here, circumscribes authenticity and inauthenticity, and at the same time opens up the possibility that it, with regard to its ontological function in this circumscription, may be yet be proved inauthentic. But whether it really is proven to be such, it seems to me, depends entirely upon laying bare that more original ground.

    Since I think it is true then, that Zeitlichkeit circumscribes authenticity and inauthenticity, but also that such a circumscription first opens up in a way that holds in reserve the possibility of a more original ontological basis for determining those modalities, I am also in a position to maintain that for the Heidegger of SZ the proper ontological point of departure for disclosing that ontological ground, out of which must spring the other two existential modalities, is still Dasein's alltägliche Indifferenz. From this, I conclude that it is this Indifferenz which serves as the condition for the possibility of the inquiry into Being.This is more than an obvious paralleling of Indifferenz with Seinvergessenheit which "at bottom" will prove itself disjunctive with it. Indifferenz in SZ means: leveling down Being--Sein überhaupt, Existenz, Zuhandenheit-- to pure Vorhandenheit. Clearly, this "averaging" is just the way in which Dasein holds itself in forgetfulness in its Alltäglichsein, preventing, among other things, the Seinsfrage from appearing as a question worthy of being asked. To be plain then: in SZ, the experience of Seinsvergessenheit is not yet determinable as an experience of inauthenticity, but rather of existential Indifferenz.


    Finally, the phenomenological evidence you submit to call into question my identification of Indifferenz and Alltäglichkeit is met with on the grounds that Selbstverlorenheit, likewise flight in the face of death, designate the way Dasein comports itself towards its ownmost Alltäglichkeit. Dasein is "inauthentic" to the extent its ownmost Indifferenz remains hidden to it as its own, while, authentic existence by contrast gains its specific determinacy in a reverse manner: by seizing upon its existential Indifferenz as its own, and indeed, as the condition for the possibility of its authenticity.

    From this, one can see that the authentic seizure of Indifferenz also implies an existentiell modification of the inauthentic Self. At the same time, the authentic Self clearly relapses into inconstancy with respect to relating itself properly to its own Indifferenz, and so one can also speak of das Manselbst an existentiell modification of the authentic Self. As I see it, this interpretation accounts for the "contradictory" excerpts above, precisely because it accounts for the manner of the origination of the existential modalities. In the hermeneutic situation of SZ, the problematic of locating a proper point of departure for the inquiry into Being cannot presuppose inauthenticity per se--since this expression only receives its proper meaning when Indifferenz is seized upon as such and its ontological meaning exhibited. But authenticity and inauthenticity must both presuppose Indifferenz.


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  8. Heidegger reminds us in his seminar on Hegel the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics that in the course of thinking through a point of contention, two people may realize that just what the very point of contention is may also up for contention. Sometimes this confusion is necessary and other times it is can be clarified beforehand. In the case of our present discussion, it seems an effort should now be made to clarify exactly what it is that we are disputing, since there appears to be some confusion or contortion of meaning in the discussion.In your last two comments, you seem to be trying to defend a few claims that you need not be, since we are and have been from the outset, as I have already said, in agreement regarding them.

    1.) You have been insistent on the fact that Modal Indifferenz precedes authenticity and inauthenticity, eg. "But authenticity and inauthenticity must both presuppose Indifferenz" Not only have I not denied this, I have expressly affirmed that it has been my interpretation (and has been so for some time), e.g. "We are in complete agreement regarding the fact that Modal Indifferenz precedes both authenticity and/or inauthenticity (nothing in the above post stands in contradiction to this)..." This is obviously not something we disagree on --as I mentioned, I proposed it to you years ago.

    2.) Another claim you have brought to the table that does not seem up for contention is the claim that Zeitlichkeit, as you put it, "circumscribes authenticity and inauthenticity"...I have called this claim "undoubtedly correct in some manner correct" ---indeed, this is an elementary claim of SZ, since, of course, Zeitlichkeit is there made a preliminary way of characterizing Dasein's Being, and both authenticity and inauthenticity are modes of the Being. The only further qualification I made to this claim is that it is Zeitlichkeit presupposes Temporalitaet and Temporalitaet must itself be rethought from out of the reversal at stake in the unpublished "Zeit und Sein." You seem to have also indicated agreement on that so we can also leave this point where it lies.

    3.)So what claims have I made that you seem to want to contend? Only these:

    A.)First, that authenticity--i.e. actual authenticity --presupposes a previous state of inauthenticity. This has nothing to do with any claim regarding Modal Indifferenz, since I am granting that the latter is a necessary condition for the possibility of authenticity. My only claim is that, within the hermeneutic situation of SZ...i.e. the "Heute" of Seinsvergessenheit, MI is not a SUFFICIENT condition for authenticity. In other words, Dasein does not choose or appropriate but falls into and becomes ensared in inauthenticity, and this falling takes place before the possible seizure of authenticity, and is its NECESSARY condition (in the present age). (Cont in next comment)

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  9. A. (Continued) --That we are destined to inauthenticity before we can full claim ourselves authentically in this extreme historical epoch is prefigured by the inauthentic absorption of our involvement with inner-worldly beings, and in general our factical lack of responsibility to our own Being. And this immediately leads to the next point of contention (B.).
    B. Secondly, I am claiming that Alltaeglichkeit in the present age is inauthentic. In fact I am claiming that it is precisely for this reason that Heidegger understands his own thinking to be possible. How do you try to avoid this conclusion regarding inauthentic alltaeglichkeit? You at first claimed that this identification was ruled out automatically, but in your last comment you seem to have backpeddled and made it yourself, only this time using the remove of a pair of quotation marks:
    "the phenomenological evidence you submit to call into question my identification of Indifferenz and Alltäglichkeit is met with on the grounds that Selbstverlorenheit, likewise flight in the face of death, designate the way Dasein comports itself towards its ownmost Alltäglichkeit. Dasein is "inauthentic" to the extent its ownmost Indifferenz remains hidden to it as its own, while, authentic existence by contrast gains its specific determinacy in a reverse manner: by seizing upon its existential Indifferenz as its own, and indeed, as the condition for the possibility of its authenticity."
    I am confused by your proposal. You previously "automatically ruled out" the identification you seem to want to (kind of?"") make. Furthermore you claim that it is only when MI "remains hidden to [Dasein] as its own. that inauthenticity comes about. I agree, but my entire claim is that this hiddeness takes place prior to and as a condition of authenticity. So this genealogy of inauthenticity is not directly relevant to the point under consideration (and, incidentally, I am in agreement with it). But if we turn to SZ itself we realize why so many interpreters have laid such emphasis on inauthentic alltaeglichkeit: Heidegger himself does, unequivocally and at great length. I will provide ample textual evidence in the next comment, and, in so doing, I will answer your question regarding how "the inauthentic Self be an existentiell modification of the authentic Self, if the authentic Self just is not an existential, that is, not essentially constitutive for existence?"

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  10. Now, perhaps when you said "Dasein is "inauthentic" to the extent its ownmost Indifferenz remains hidden to it as its own, while, authentic existence by contrast gains its specific determinacy in a reverse manner: by seizing upon its existential Indifferenz as its own, and indeed, as the condition for the possibility of its authenticity," you were not trying to backpeddle at all, and the "extent" (of MI's hiddeness) you were speaking of should be understood as entirely separate from the state of alltaeglichkeit. There are two responses I have for this possibility.
    The first is a quick reminder regarding authenticity: The fact that authentic existenz enacts itslef "by seizing upon its existential Indifferenz as its own, and indeed, as the condition for the possibility of its authenticity" my own reasing also will accomodate, but with one crucial adjustment: in the hermeneutic situation of SZ, MI may underlie the structure of authenticity but only as mediated by inauthenticity. Because, however, inauthenticity is not a static state but a factical possibility which may be modified into authenticity, it is clear that we speak more precisely when we say simply that it is inauthenticity which is seized upon --and so modified --when authenticity is enacted. Heidegger does call authenticity an "existentiell modification of inauthenticity" but does he call ever call authenticity an existentiell modification of MI? I'll leave that as an open question.
    The second response is I have regards your claim that inauthenticity and alltaeglichkeit are not identifiable, since the latter is not only the domain of average indifference, but (as you seem to equate the two --an equation I am inclined to reject), also the domain of Modal Indifferenz. Now this claim seems to me to be consistently refuted by the text of SZ itself, though I am open to your hearing your reading strategy here. Let's look at a few samples (see next comment)

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  11. Dasein's factical existenz means that it is thrown. Because it is thrown, the possibilities of its existenz are given in thrownness. Only in and from out of these thrown possibilities can Dasein become its authentic self. But what modality does Dasein have in thrownness? At H. 181:

    "Die Geworfenheit aber ist die Seinsart eines
    Seienden, das je seine Möglichkeiten selbst ist, so zwar, daß es sich in und aus ihnen versteht (auf sie sich entwirft). Das In-derWelt-sein, zu dem ebenso ursprünglich das Sein bei Zuhandenem gehört wie das Mitsein mit Anderen, ist je umwillen seiner selbst.
    Das Selbst aber ist zunächst und zumeist uneigentlich, das Manselbst. Das In-der-Welt-sein ist immer schon verfallen.

    (But thrownness is a mode of Being of a being which always IS itself its possibilities in such a way that it understands itself in them and from them (projects itself upon them)...But the self is initially and for the most part inauthentic, They-self (Das Man). Being-in -the-World is always already fallen.")

    This statement makes clear that, initially, in its throwness, the self is the inauthentic They-Self. But let's continue. In this statement Heidegger is only rephrasing something he has been at pains to make clear in the previous section (B. Das alltägliche Sein des Da und das Verfallen des Daseins paragraphs 35-38). At the beginning of that section (H. 167) Heidegger asks:
    "Die Frage erhebt sich jetzt: welches sind die
    existenzialen Charaktere der Erschlossenheit des In-der-Weltseins, sofern dieses sich als alltägliches in der Seinsart des Man hält?" (Now the question arises: What are the existential characteristics of the disclosedness of Being-In-the World, to the extent that the latter, AS SOMETHING EVERYDAY, MAINTAINS itself in the mode of Being of the They?")
    I could emphasize that the German here is unambiguous; it cannot be rendered, "...insofar as the everyday holds itself in the manner of Being of the They" because the "dieses sich" must refer back to the "Erschlossenheit des In-der-Weltseins" and so the clause in question should be translated as to emphasize that it is precisely QUA everyday(ly) that Dasein is has the mode of Being of the They". I could emphasize this. But there is no point because the abundance of time where Heidegger, in this section and elsewhere, emphasizes how everydayness is inauthentic makes such attention to detail (at least on a blog comment) quite superfluous. In keeping with my above post, Heidegger makes clear that gerede, as one aspect of the everyday mode of mode of Being the There, is precisely the *inauthentic* mode of rede. Thus when you objected, glossing my statement regarding gerede in your first comment above, "given the context of the remark, I interpret you to be identifying everydayness as the realm of inauthenticity." I would say you also object to Heidegger here...for manifestly the everydayness taken up in these sections is domain of the They-Self.

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  12. C.) The final claim I made that is now being disputed is about inauthenticity and authenticity ---specifically whether and how, in the hermeneutic situation that SZ explicates, both of them can be regarded as existentials. What exactly was my claim? It ran as follows: "Heidegger states clearly that this inauthentic self is an existential. But where does he state that the authentic self is? Never." What was my point? That authenticity is flatly not an existential? No. In fact you rightly cite Heidegger referring to it if not as an existential at least as a mode of existenz. My point however is that Heidegger does not explicate explicitly as an existential, and if he does so explicate it implicitly as one (which I could concede), he does not do so until the second Division of SZ undertakes its temporal repetition of the first. In other words, in order to speak of authenticity concretely, it was necessary FIRST to treat of the existential of inauthenticity as it is found in everydayness, because this is precisely what authenticity has to recover. This is my point in emphasizing the conspicuous way Heidegger avoids calling authenticity an existential. The entire point is: In SZ's analytic, Inauthenticity has primacy in the order of discovery. Authenticity must FIRST be understood as an existentiell modification of inauthenticity. Now what about your puzzle passage? You ask how "the inauthentic Self can be an existentiell modification of the authentic Self, if the authentic Self just is not an existential, that is, not essentially constitutive for existence?" I remind you that the real point I am making is not that authenticity is not an existential but that it cannot initially be discovered as that, hence the order of SZ. With that in mind I have a two remarks in response to your question. The first is that, strictly from a textual point of view, Heidegger simply does not create the parallel statement --his two seemingly contradictory (for Stambaugh but not you or I) "existentiell modifciations" are not exactly parallel because, in the second statement (318) he conspiciously omits the very part so relevant to our discussion, namely "als eines wesenhaften Existenzials," a phrase reserved only for inauthenticity. In addition it is important to note the ORDER of these two passages, namely that inauthenticity is treated FIRST as an Existential, and only later is it regarded as an existentiell modfication --though to be sure without (yet) naming authenticity as an Existential. Now to my positive interpretation of the passage in question. How does Heidegger speak of Authenticity as something existentielly modified by inauthenticity? See next comment

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  13. Nww when you reproduced the relevant quotation at H 318 you omitted something crucial. You quoted:

    (It became evident [in that earlier analysis of das Man--U.D.], that first of all and for the most part Dasein is not itself, but has been lost in the "They-Self." This (Self) is an existentiell modification of the authentic Self. (SZ, 318.)

    But if I simply give the first part of the sentence and the preceding sentence a different sense is preserved:

    "Die vorliegende Analytik stieß denn auch schon bei der vorbereitenden Charakteristik der Alltäglichkeit auf die Frage nach dem Wer des Daseins. Es zeigte sich, zunächst und zumeist ist das Dasein nicht es selbst, sondern im Man-selbst verloren. Dieses ist eine existenzielle Modifikation des eigentlichen Selbst. Die Frage nach der ontologischen Verfas-sung der Selbstheit blieb unbeantwortet."

    Here Heidegger makes clear that it is in the preparatory characterization of **everydayness** that his analytic has come up against the question of the who as Manselbst. In its everydayness Dsein is lost in the They. This reinforces my claim of identification between alltaeglichkeit and inauthenticity, precisely at the place where Stambaugh would appeal to evidence against the primacy of inauthenticity. So what does Heidegger mean in his next sentence when he tells us inauthenticity modifies authenticity? To understand this we must understand the larger context of this passage. That context is the question of Dasein's unity, as the first lines of the same paragraph make clear: "Wie sollen wir diese Einheit begreifen? Wie kann das Dasein einheitlich in den genannten Weisen und Möglichkeiten seines Seins existieren?" Dasein still has the essential possibility of Being itself, and it has it not just despite of but because of its state of inauthenticity.Why? Because a being that can be away and lost in the They already has the structure of ownership with regard to itself, otherwise it could not first stumble upon itself as dis-owned lost. This ownly manner of Being is eigentlich. But Heidegger is not talking yet about the enactment of authenticity ---rather he is talking about a still to be enacted possibility that is found in the structure of Dasein. But this still to be enacted possibility of owning one's own Being is first concretely encountered in and as dis-ownership, i.e. everyday inauthentic They self. Does this concrete disownership of historical Dasein presuppose the structure of MI? Of course. But my claim has nothing to do with that. I merely said that, in the hermeneutic situation of SZ, the condition for the possibility of authenticity --and again as I said before --actual authenticity and not just a structure of ownership inscribed in Dasein, a structure which may itself be called "authenticity," provided we understand the range of that term in its german original --is actual, i.e. factical, inauthenticity. Indeed it is precisely because inauthenticity is a manifestation of ownership which is a deficient mode or modification that Dasein can see in inauthenticity, i.e. in the thrown possibilities of its everyday existence, the possibility of actual authenticity that is still to be enacted --provided that is, that it can respond to the call that comes from it itself, namely the call of gewissenheit...

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